This study probed a crucial assumption underlying much of the ethics theory and research: do managers perceive ethical behavior to be an important personal job requirement? A large sample of managers from a cross-section of industries and job functions indicated that, compared to other job duties, certain ethical behaviors were moderate to somewhat major parts of their jobs. Some noteworthy differences by industry, organization size, tenure and job function were also found. These findings underscore the importance of ethics for business (...) education. They also have implications for manager selection, training, and development by organizations. (shrink)

Chapter 1 is an introduction. I will examine the writings about Quakers of More, Locke, Leibniz and Hume, whether or not the writings are themselves philosophy. I explain why, except for what I say about them in chapter 1, Anne Conway, Princess Elisabeth and Spinoza are not otherwise within the scope of the thesis. Chapter 2 examines More’s three criticisms of Quakers: (1) Quaking is not a guide to divine inspiration or truth. He was right about this, but the objection (...) became less important as Quakers stopped quaking. (2) By ignoring reason and conscience, Quakers leave themselves open to supposed inspirations which are contrary to reason and good manners. Quakers behave badly, which is evidence that their supposed inspirations are not genuine. This is essentially the same objection as is made by Locke and Leibniz, whose writings we examine in chapter 2. (3) The Quakers’ emphasis on Christ within (the light within) leads them to deny Christ without, the external, historical man who died, was resurrected, and is now in heaven. They deny what More considers to be essential to Christian faith. More’s interpretation of the early Quakers was correct, as his example of William Smith’s Quaker primer for children proves. Keith sought to answer More’s objection in an appendix to the second edition of his Immediate Revelation. As the Quakers’ thinking developed and (in the case of Smith) was posthumously ‘clarified’ i.e. corrected, they and More came to agree on the necessity of both Christ within and Christ without. So this objection also became less important. Chapter 3 examines the writings of Locke and Leibniz, including their correspondence, relating to Quakers. Did Quakers really believe that their inspirations should be accepted without any check or test involving reason or scripture? Yes, as Barclay’s discussion of his second proposition in the Apology shows. Both Locke and Leibniz studied works by Barclay. Locke became very close friends with the Quaker, Benjamin Furly, but his consistent position was that Quakers were enthusiasts and, because of their refusal to test apparent inspirations using reason, vulnerable to delusions. Leibniz expressed the same position most clearly in a short piece on apologetic work drafted, perhaps, in 1685. Locke’s views were most fully expressed in Book four, chapter 19 (‘Of Enthusiasm’) of the 1700 edition of his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, with which Leibniz agreed in this New Essays. More, Locke and Leibniz were each Christians, and each was concerned to defend Christianity from Quaker enthusiasm. Chapter 4 examines Hume’s writings about Quakers in his essay “Of Superstition and Enthusiasm”, his History and a letter to the Quaker Elizabeth Shackleton. His portrait of early Quaker enthusiasm is very similar to that of his predecessors: the early Quakers were deluded enthusiasts whose pride led them to think they communicated directly with God. But his discussion serves quite a different purpose. Hume’s criticism of early Quaker excesses implies that they were foolish to follow biblical precepts. His discussion of the Quakers also implies that in a religious body in which belief is no longer supported by either superstition and priests, or the fires of enthusiasm, only reason remains, and belief in Christianity will fall away, leaving only something like deism or Confucianism. (shrink)

Some decades ago in his intriguing book on Jonathan Edwards, Perry Miller used to great effect the device of supposing a two-fold biography of Edwards, an external one consisting of the historical record embracing the major events of his life and times, and an internal one aimed at an interpretation of the mind of Edwards and the development of his thought.

There is an undercurrent to be detected in Anselm's record of the meditative experience that issued in the Ontological Argument and, although it points to a profound and perennial problem in the interpretation of religion, this undercurrent has been largely ignored. The Argument, as is well known, moves entirely within the medium of reflective meaning focused on the idea of God and, unlike the cosmological arguments of later theologians, it makes no appeal whatever to a principle of causality or to (...) the discovery of a sufficient reason for finite existence. Anselm seems to have had his own sense of what one may call the unadulterated rationalism of the Argument when, in his own words, he wondered, ‘if perhaps it might be possible to find one single argument that for its proof required no other save itself, and that by itself would suffice to prove that God really exists’. Here we are entirely within that inner chamber of the mind so dear to the Augustinian tradition, a mind from which one is to exclude all thought save that of God. The task of the one who reflects is to penetrate the inner meaning of this thought in order to discover what it implies beyond what is evident on the surface. With such an eminently rational or logical aim occupying the centre of attention, it is quite understandable that the presence of another, and quite opposed, concern should have been overlooked - Anselm's concern, namely, to transcend, as it were, the medium of thought itself, and enter into the presence of God. The reason that this concern introduces a tension in the search for a proof is that the realization of presence would seem to render proof superfluous, while the inference in an argument - especially one moving towards existence – inevitably suggests, in some sense and to some degree, the absence of what is sought for. (shrink)

Although Paton depends for his materials on virtually all of Kant's writings on moral philosophy, he makes the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten central to his analysis. This is a wise choice and one that is defensible since Paton has set for himself the task of elucidating the categorical imperative and it is in the Grundlegung that Kant sought to grasp the supreme principle of morality and its appearance to us as a categorical imperative. Despite the fact that, as the (...) author points out on many occasions, the Grundlegung neither stresses morality from the standpoint of action, nor does it deal in detail with many significant problems, it must nevertheless always be looked upon as central to Kant's ethics just because it does deal with the supreme principle as a categorical imperative. The seemingly more authoritative Critique of Practical Reason is more definitely concerned with the larger subject of reason in its practical employment and does not deal as directly with Paton's special concern as the Grundlegung does. (shrink)

In this article I argue that evolutionary psychological strategies for making inferences about present-day human psychology are methodologically unsound. Evolutionary psychology is committed to the view that the mind has an architecture that has been conserved since the Pleistocene, and that our psychology can be fruitfully understood in terms of the original, fitness-enhancing functions of these conserved psychological mechanisms. But for evolutionary psychological explanations to succeed, practitioners must be able to show that contemporary cognitive mechanisms correspond to those that were (...) selected for in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness, that these present-day cognitive mechanisms are descended from the corresponding ancestral mechanisms, and that they have retained the functions of the ancestral mechanisms from which they are descended. I refer to the problem of demonstrating that these conditions obtain as “the matching problem,” argue that evolutionary psychology does not have the resources to address it, and conclude that evolutionary psychology, as it is currently understood, is therefore impossible. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of what organisms are and therefore what kinds of biological entities qualify as organisms. For some time now, the concept of organismality has been eclipsed by the notion of individuality. Biological individuals are those systems that are units of selection. I develop a conception of organismality that does not rely on evolutionary considerations, but instead draws on development and ecology. On this account, organismality and individuality can come apart. Organisms, in my view, are as Godfrey- (...) class='Hi'>Smith puts it “essentially persisters.” I argue that persistence is underpinned by differentiation, integration, development, and the constitutive embeddedness of organisms in their worlds. I examine two marginal cases, the Portuguese Man O’ War and the honey bee colony, and show that both count as organisms in light of my analysis. Next, I examine the case of holobionts, hosts plus their microsymbionts, and argue that they can be counted as organisms even though they may not be biological individuals. Finally, I consider the question of whether other, less tightly integrated biological systems might also be treated as organisms. (shrink)

This paper makes a plea for more reflexive attempts to develop and anchor the emerging concept of responsible research and innovation. RRI has recently emerged as a buzzword in science policy, becoming a focus of concerted experimentation in many academic circles. Its performative capacity means that it is able to mobilise resources and spaces despite no common understanding of what it is or should be ‘made of’. In order to support reflection and practice amongst those who are interested in and (...) using the concept, this paper unpacks understandings of RRI across a multi-disciplinary body of peer-reviewed literature. Our analysis focuses on three key dimensions of RRI that remain particularly opaque. A total of 48 publications were selected through a systematic literature search and their content was qualitatively analysed. Across the literature, RRI is portrayed as a concept that embeds numerous features of existing approaches to govern and assess emerging technologies. Our analysis suggests that its greatest potential may be in its ability to unify and provide political momentum to a wide range of long-articulated ethical and policy issues. At the same time, RRI’s dynamism and resulting complexity may represent its greatest challenge. Further clarification on what RRI has to offer in practice—beyond what has been offered to date—is still needed, as well as more explicit engagement with research and institutional cultures of responsibility. Such work may help to realise the high political expectations that are attached to nascent RRI. (shrink)

Following with the discovery of the electron by J. J. Thomson at the end of the nineteenth century a steady elucidation of the structure of the atom occurred over the next 40 years culminating in the discovery of nuclear fission in 1938–1939. The significant steps after the electron discovery were: discovery of the nuclear atom by Rutherford (Philos Mag 6th Ser 21:669–688, 1911 ), the transformation of elements by Rutherford (Philos Mag 37:578–587, 1919 ), discovery of artificial radioactivity by Joliot-Curie (...) and Joliot-Curie (Comptes Rendus Acad Sci Paris 198:254–256, 1934 ), and the discovery of the neutron by Chadwick (Nature 129:312, 1932a , Proc R Soc Ser A 136:692–708, 1932b ; Proc R Soc Lond Ser A 136:744–748, 1932c ). The neutron furnished scientists with a particle able to penetrate atomic nuclei without expenditure of large amounts of energy. From 1934 until 1938–1939 investigations of the reaction between a neutron and uranium were carried out by E. Fermi in Rome, O. Hahn, L. Meitner and F. Strassmann in Berlin and I. Curie and P. Savitch in Paris. Results were interpreted as the formation of transuranic elements. After sorting out complex radio-chemistry and radio-physics O. Hahn and F. Strassmann came to the conclusion, beyond their belief, that the uranium nucleus split into smaller fragments, that is nuclear fission. This was soon followed in 1939 by its theoretical interpretation by L. Mietner and O. Frisch. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that Kierkegaard's relationship to the mystical tradition is misconstrued in the secondary literature, and that a fuller account of his attitude toward mysticism reveals a more appreciative stance toward it, which in turn reveals a more mystical religious dialectic. To that end, in the first chapter, I give an account of what is taken to be Kierkegaard's anti-mysticism, and then show that the resources in other signed sources, like Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, allow us to (...) see that Kierkegaard dislikes what he calls mysticism, but what he calls mysticism is not what contemporary scholarship believes it to be. Accordingly, Kierkegaard himself could be a mystic on some definitions of that term. ;The three chapters that immediately follow are devoted to explicating Kierkegaard's religious dialectic in such a way as to show that mystical themes pervade the work. In the second chapter, I argue that the nothingness of the self is a necessary condition, according to Kierkegaard, for any wholeness that the self might acquire. Further, in the third chapter, I argue that Kierkegaard's conception of God permits a rich notion of union with God . In the fourth chapter, I explain that Works of Love picks up where the pseudonyms left off, and articulates the union with God where such union is at once loving action, for God is love. ;In the final chapter, I conclude by showing that Kierkegaard has marked structural similarities to mystics such as Eckhart, who is warmly received by the Japanese philosophical tradition, particularly in the writings of its Zen and Pure Land Buddhist representatives. I then go on to show that Kierkegaard's writings are a fruitful source for comparative philosophy of religion, for while Kierkegaardians can also learn from the writings of these Japanese thinkers, Kierkegaard's writings can provide responses to many objections that are commonly leveled against both Kierkegaard's thought in particular and Christian philosophy in general. (shrink)

This article queries the sense of `violence' in Derrida's early work, especially Of Grammatology. After a thorough reading of Derrida's analyses, and an inspection of his own moral and political rhetoric interspersed through his writing on writing, I offer a criticism of Derrida's treatment of violence. Derrida figures socio-political or `empirical' violence as conditioned by the more basic play of the trace; the `transcendental' violence of inscription and law. This move brings him within a hair's-breadth of affirming a violence more (...) mythic than transcendental; or mythic because transcendental and ostensibly `necessary'. (shrink)

The idea of arousal as a non-specific state of activation has been implicated as an explanatory factor for many aspects of human behavior, ranging from emotional experiences to learning and memory. Critiques of this concept have highlighted that arousal is ambiguous and evidence for its role in emotion is mixed. However, contemporary emotion theories and empirical research continue to incorporate the concept of arousal in ways that fail to address its problems. Here, we review the origins of the term arousal (...) in physiology and trace how it has been translated and applied to psychology (particularly as it relates to emotion). We consider whether the construct of arousal is currently (a) consistent and (b) useful in understanding human behavior. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of EnlightenmentJohn E. SmithAvihu Zakai. Jonathan Edwards's Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. xvii + 348. Cloth, $49.95.Edwards's History of Redemption is the focus of this study by Avihu Zakai—Professor of History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The History is a (...) series of thirty sermons Edwards preached on Isaiah 51:8 "... my righteousness shall be forever... my salvation from generation to generation." For him, it was a "new method in divinity... thrown into the form of a history"—a narrative showing God's sovereignty in redemption "from the fall of man to the end of the world."Zakai gives a comprehensive account of Edwards's view of history meant to highlight his struggle against modern beliefs threatening Christian faith (308; passim). The discussion is not limited to history, but includes most of Edwards's writing from 1720-1750 with emphasis on his opposition to the Enlightenment. Zakai cannot interpret so many works with the accuracy needed; he repeats old errors such as opposing the "head" and "heart" in the Affections and minimizing Edwards's respect for "common morality" in the ethical writings. Zakai is right in saying that Edwards insisted on God's authority over the world and history, but he puts it in such absolutistic terms that he often seems to abandon historical analysis in favor of exhortation.Zakai's best contribution is in his search for the general framework of God's redemption of the "engine" driving history (120ff.; 213ff.). He finds the answer in "seasons" of revival such as the Great Awakening. This is true, but Edwards notes other special events like the Reformation that "promoted the work of redemption" (Works, 9. 272), but are not revivals in the usual sense. For Edwards, special events are of many kinds and are identified by interpretation based on God's Providence. As Miller claimed, interpretation is essential; without it we may have a chronicle of events, but no history. Zakai seems to underestimate this point and the many problems it poses.The book strikes me as one more attempt—George Marsden's recent book, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven, 2003), is another—to rescue Edwards from "profane" interpreters like Miller who saw that Edwards learned from the Enlightenment even though he challenged many of its ideas. In my view, Edwards can well take care of himself.John E. SmithYale UniversityCopyright © 2004 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)